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Abstract: The paper addresses the issue of optimal investments in innovations. As
an example, investments in the construction of gas pipelines are considered. Rational
decisions in choosing the commercialization times (stopping times) can be associated
with Nash equilibria in a game between the projects. In this game, the total benefits
gained during the pipelines' life periods act as payoffs and commercialization times as
strategies. The goal of this paper is to characterize multiequilibria in the game of timing.
The case of two players is studied in detail. A key point in the analysis is the observation
that all player's best response commercialization times concentrate at two instants that are
fixed in advance. This reduces decisionmaking to choosing between two fixed investment
policies, fast and slow, with the prescribed commercialization times. A description of
a computational algorithm that finds all the Nash equilibria composed of fast and slow
scenarios concludes the paper. Copyright © 2003 IFAC
Keywords: Optimal stopping problem, game of timing, muitiequilibria, econometric
analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
If several large-scale gas pipeline projects
compete for a new gas market, the choices of
the commercialization times (stopping times), i.e., the
times of finalizing the construction of the pipelines,
determine the future structure of the market and thus
become especially important. In the paper (Klaassen
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Research, Grant 02-01-00769, and the Program for the Sponsorship
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et al., 2001b), which motivated the present study, a
detailed pipeline model based on classical patterns of
mathematical economics (see (Arrow and Kurz, 1970),
(Intriligator, 1971)) was designed and a best reply
dynamic adaptation algorithm originating from the
theory of evolutionary games (see (Friedman, 1991)
- (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988), (Kaniovski et
aI., 2000), (Kryazhimskii and Osipov, 1995)-
(Kryazhimskii et aI., 2(01), (Tarasyev, 1999)) was
used to estimate numerically the commercialization
times for the pipeline projects competing nowadays
for the Turkey gas market.
Rational choices of the commercialization times can
be viewed as Nash equilibria in a game between
the projects. We study the structure of this game
in terms of game theory (see (Basar and Olsder,
1982), (Vorob'ev, 1977». A background of the gas
infrastructure model (see (Klaassen et al., 2001a»
and constructions of the optimal timing problem (see
(Barzel, 1968), (Tarasyev and Watanabe, 2(01» are
employed.
The model takes into account the stages of
construction and exploitation of the gas pipelines.
In each level, the model is optimized and estimated
using appropriate techniques of theory of optimal
control and theory of differential games (see
(Chernousko, 1994), (Krasovskii and Subbotin, 1988),
(Pontryagin et al., 1962». At the stage of exploitation,
as gas supply policies compete on market,
decisionmaking is relatively clear: the competitors
search for an equilibrium supply at any instant. We
focus, therefore, on the stage of construction, at which
investment policies compete and decisionmaking
is concerned with strong long-term aftereffects.
The competitors interact through choosing their
commercialization times. A proper individual choice
is the best response to the choices of the other
competitor. Therefore, a pair of commercialization
times is suitable to every competitor if and only if the
commercialization time of every competitor responds
best to the commercialization time of the other
competitor. Such situations constitute Nash equilibria
in the game under consideration. In this game, the
total benefits gained during the pipelines' life periods
act as payoffs and commercialization times act as
strategies. Our goal is to characterize the equilibria
in this game of timing. A key point in the analysis
is the observation that all player's best response
commercialization times concentrate at two instants
that are fixed in advance. This reduces decisionmaking
to choosing between two fixed investment policies,
fast and slow, with the prescribed commercialization
times. We describe an algorithm that finds all the Nash
equilibria in the game of timing. We give results of the
model-based analysis for two case studies: competing
gas pipeline projects in the Caspian region, and the
planned pipeline routes to the gas market in China.
2. GAME OF TIMING
We construct a game-theoretic model of competition
of two gas pipeline projects. We associate players
1 and 2 with the investors of projects 1 and 2,
respectively. Assuming that the starting time for
making investments is 0, we consider virtual positive
commercialization times of projects 1 and 2 (i.e., the
final times of the construction of the pipelines), t l
and t2. Given a commercialization time, ti, player i
(i = 1,2) can estimate the cost, Ci(ti), for finalizing
project i at time ti. The positive-valued cost functions
Ci(ti) (i = 1,2) are defined on the positive half-axis.
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Assumption 2.1. For each player, i, the cost function,
Ci(ti), is smooth, monotonicaIIy decreasing and
convex.
In what follows, the rate of cost reduction for player
i is understood as the positive-valued monotonically
decreasing function
ai(ti) = -C:(ti)' (1)
At any time t > 0, the price of gas and costs for
extraction and transportation of gas determine the
benefit rate of player I, bl (t). The costs for extraction
and transportation of gas do not depend on the state
of project 2, whereas the price of gas depends on the
presence of player 2 on the marketplace. Hence, the
benefit rate bl (t) may take two values, upper - bu (t),
and lower - bI2 (t),
bll(t) > bI2 (t). (2)
Similarly, we introduce the upper and lower benefit
rates of player 2 at time t, b21 (t) and b22 (t),
b21 (t) > ~2(t). (3)
We assume that the positive-valued upper and lower
benefit rates bil (t) and bi2 (t) (i = 1, 2) are continuous
functions defined on the positive half-axis.
Assumption 2.2. For every player i (i = 1,2), the
graph of the rate of cost reduction, ai (t), intersects the
graph of the upper benefit rate, bil (t), from above at
the unique point ti > 0, and stays below it afterwards;
similarly, the graph of ai(t) intersects the graph of
bi2 (t) from above at the unique point tt > 0, and
stays below it afterwards.
It is clear that
(4)
Denote by t2 the commercialization time of player 2.
The benefit rate of player I, bl (t), equals bll (t) for
t < t2 and equals bl2 (t) for t ~ t2. We stress the
dependence of bl (t) on t2 and write bl (tlt2) instead
ofbl(t)
b (I ) - { bll (t) if t < t 2 , (5)
I t t2 - bl2 (t) if t ~ t2.
Similarly, a commercialization time tl of project
determines the benefit rate of player 2 as
{
b21 (t) ift<tl,
b2(tltd = b22 (t) if t ~ t l .
Given a commercialization time of player I, tl, and
a commercialization time of player 2, t2, the total
benefits of the players are represented by the integrals
Bdtl, t2) = 1= bl (tlt2)dt, (6)
tl
B2(t1, t2) = {= b2(tlt l )dt. (7)lt2
Assumption 2.3. For every positive t l and every
positive t2 the integrals B i (tl, t2) (i = 1,2) are finite.
Given commercialization times of the players, t l and
t2, the total profit of player i is defined as
Pi (t l ,t2) = -Ci(ti) + B i (tl,t2). (8)
We define the game of timing for players 1 and 2 in
line with the standards of game theory (see (Vorob'ev,
1977)). In the game of timing, the strategies of player
i (i = 1,2) are the positive commercialization times,
ti, for project i, and the payoff to player i, thanks to
strategies tl and t2 of players 1 and 2, respectively, is
the total profit Pi(tl, t2)'
3. NASH EQUILIBRIA
According to the standard terminology of game theory,
a strategy ti of player 1 is said to be a best response
of player 1 to a strategy t2 of player 2 if ti maximizes
the payoff to player 1, PI (tl, t2), over the set of all
strategies of player 1, t l :
PI (ti, t2) = max PI (t l , t2)'
t, >0
Similarly, a strategy ti of player 2 is said to be a best
response of player 2 to a strategy tl of player I if ti
maximizes the payoff to player 2, P2(t l , t2), over the
set of all strategies of player 2, t2:
P2(tI,t;) = maxP2(tl,t2).
t2>0
Any pair (ti , ti), where ti is a best response of player
1 to ti and ti is a best response of player 2 to ti, is
said to be a Nash equilibrium in the game of timing.
Our goal is to characterize the Nash equilibria in the
game of timing. We start with analysis of the payoffs.
The differentiation of PI (t l , t2) with respect to t l
yields
Let us take two arbitrary strategies of player 2, t21 and
t22 > t21· As (9) shows,
aPI(tl,tn) aPI (h,t21)
atl atl
for tl < t2I and for tl > tn, and
aPI (t l ,t22) _ 8pdt l,t2d (b ( ) b ( ))
at l - atl - 11 t
l
- 12 t l ,
for t2I < t l < t22. We have stated that beyond the
time interval located between t21 and t22, PI (tl, t22)
and PI (t l , t2d have the same rate in t l , and within
this interval PI (t l , t22) declines in tl faster than
Pdtl ,t2d. Thanks to (6) and (5) PI (tl,t22) =
Pdt l , t2d for t l ~ t22· Therefore, Pdt l , t22) >
PI (tI,t2d fortI < t22·
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Proposition 3.1. For every t l > 0, the payoff to
player 1, PI (t l ,t2), increases in t 2; moreover, given
a t21 > 0 and a t 22 > t21, one has PI (tl,t22) =
Pdtl,t2d fortI ~ t 22 ,andPI (tI,tn ) > PI (t l ,t21 )
for tl < t22·
Symmetric arguments are valid for player 2.
Proposition 3.2. For every t2 > 0, the payoff to
player 2, P2(tl,t2), increases in tl; moreover, given
a t Il > 0 and a t l 2 > t Il , one has P2(t I 2, t2) =
P2(tIl, t2) for t2 ~ t12, and P2(tI2, t2) > P2(t ll , t2)
for t2 < t12·
Let us find the best responses of player I to a given
strategy, t2, of player 2. It is easy enough to identify
the intervals of growth and decline of the payoff
PI (tl' t2) as a function of t l . We use (9) and refer
to the points t l and tt, at which the graph of al(t),
intersects the graphs of bIl (t) and bI2 (t).
Assume, first, that t2 ::; t l ; recall that t l < tt (see
(4». Then the graph of al (td lies above the graph of
bl (t l lt2) for tl < tt and lies below it for tl > tt; at
tl = tt the graphs intersect.
Due to (9), 8Pdt l , t 2)/atl is positive for t l < tt
(tl f t2) and negative for tl > tt· Therefore, tl = tt
is the unique maximizer of PI (t l , t2) in the set of all
positive t l .
Let us assume that t2 ~ tt. Then the graph of al (tl)
lies above the graph of bl (tllt2) for tl < t l , and lies
below it for tl > t l ; at tl = tt the graphs intersect.
Due to (9),aPI(tl,t2)/atl is positive for t l < t l and
negative for t l > t l (t l f t2)' Hence, tl = t l is the
unique maximizer of PI (tl, t2) in the set of all positive
tl·
Now let t2 lie in the interval [t l ,tt]. Then the graph
of al (t l ) lies above the graph of bl (t l lt2) for tl < t l ,
lies below it for t l < t l < t2, lies again above
the graph of bl (tllt2) for t2 < t l < tt and again
below it for t l > tt. Thanks to (9) we conclude that,
PI (t l ,t2), as a function of t l , strictly increases on
the interval (0, t l ), strictly decreases on the interval
(t l , t2), strictly increases on the interval (t2' tt), and
strictly decreases on the interval (tt, 00). Therefore,
the maximizers of PI (t l , t2) in the set of all positive
tl are restricted to the two-element set {t l ,tt}.
Let us identify the actual maximizers in this set.
Suppose t2 < tt· Set h = tt, t21 = t 2 and t22 = tt·
We see that tl = t22 > t21' By Proposition 3.1 we
have
PI (tt, tt) = PI (tt, t2)' (l0)
Since PI (tt,t2) is continuous in t2, (10) holds for
t2 = tt· Now we take arbitrary t21 and tn > t21
in the interval [t l ,tt]. By Proposition 3.1 PI (t l ,t22)
> PI (t l ,t21)' Therefore, PI (t l ,t2) strictly increases
in t2 on [tt, t;]. Consider the function
P(t2) = PI (t l ,t2) - PI (tt,t2), (11)
defined on [t l ,tt]. By (l0) we have
P(t2) = PI(t1,t2) - PI (ti,tt),
for all t2 in the interval [ti, tt]· As long as PI (tl' t2)
strictly increases in t2 on [t1,ti], P(t2) strictly
increases on [ti, tt]. Earlier, we have stated that ti
is the single best response of player 1 to any t2 ~ t1;
this holds, in particular, for t2 = t1, i.e.,
pdti, t1) > PI (t1,t1)·
located strictly above the segment [£2,00) on the t2-
axis at level t1. Points (ti, £2) and (t1,£2) lie on the
graph.
A symmetric argument characterizes the best
responses of player 2.
Proposition 3.4. In the interval (t2" , tt), there exists
the unique point £1 such that
Hence, (13)
p(t1) = P1(t1,t1) - p1(ti,t1) < O.
Earlier, we have stated that t1 is the single best
response of player 1 to any t2 ~ tt; this holds, in
particular, for t2 = ti, i.e.,
PI (t1,tn > PI (tt, ti)·
Hence,
p(ti) = PI (t1 ,tn - PI (ti, tn > O.
We have found that P(t2) takes a negative value at the
left end point of the interval [t1,ti] and a positive
value at the right end point of this interval. Since
P(t2) is continuous, there exists a £2 in the interior
of [t1,tt], for which p(£2) = O. The fact that P(t2)
strictly increases on [t1,ti] implies that the point £2 is
unique, i.e., P(t2) < 0 for t1 ~ t2 < £2 and P(t2) > 0
for ti ~ t2 > £2. By the definition ofP(t12), (11), we
have
All best responses of player 1 to t2 lie in the two-
element set {t1,ti}. Therefore, we conclude that if
t2 = £2, player 1 has two best responses, t1 and ti, to
t2; if t1 ~ t2 < £2, the unique best response of player
1 to t2 is tt; and if tt ~ t2 > £2, the unique best
response of player 1 to t2 is t1. The best response of
player 1 to t2 is ti if t2 < t1, and t1 if t2 > tt. We
summarize as follows.
Proposition 3.3. In the interval (tl' tn, there exists
the unique point £2 such that
- - + -PI (t 1 ,t2) = Pdt1 , t2). (12)
The set of all best responses of player 1 to £2 is
{t1,tn. If 0 < t2 < £2, then the unique best response
of player 1 to t2 is tt .If t2 > £2, then the unique best
response of player 1 to t2 is t1.
We call t1 the fast choice of player 1 and ti the slow
choice of player 1. We call £2 the switch point for
player 1.
Let us consider the function that associates to each
strategy, t2, of player 2 the set of all best responses
of player 1 to t2; we call it the best response function
of player 1. The graph of the best response function
of player 1 consists of the horizontal segment located
strictly above the segment (0, £2] on the t2 - axis
at level tt, and the unbounded horizontal segment
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The set of all best responses of player 2 to £1 is
{t2",tt}.IfO < t1 < £1, then the unique best response
of player 2 to t1 is tt· If t1 > £1, then the unique best
response of player 2 to t 1 is t2".
We call t2" the fast choice of player 2, tt the slow
choice of player 2, and £2 the switch point for player 2.
We also introduce the best response function of player
2, which associates to each strategy, t I , of player 1
the set of all best responses of player 2 to t 1. The
graph of the best response function of player 2 consists
of the vertical segment located to the right of the
segment (0, £1] on the t1 - axis at distance tt, and the
unbounded vertical segment located to the right of the
segment [£1,00) on the t1 - axis at distance t2" . Points
- + -(t1, t2 ) and (tI, t2") lie on the graph.
Nash equilibria (ti, t2) belong to the intersection of
the graphs of the best response functions of players 1
and 2 and are characterized by the following relations
- + - +t2 ~ t2 , t1 < t1 , (14)
- + - +t2 ~ t2 , t1 < t I < t1 , (15)
- - +t2 ~ t2", t1 < t1 < t1 , (16)
- + - +t2" ~ t2 < t2 , t1 < t1 ~ t1 , (17)
- + - +t2" < t2 ~ t2 , t1 ~ t1 < t1 , (18)
- + -t2"<t2<t2 , t1~tl' (19)
- + - +t2" < t2 < t2 , t1 ~ t1 , (20)
- - +t2<t2", t1~t1. (21)
Proposition 3.5. In cases (14), (15) and (19) the
unique Nash equilibrium is slow-fast, (tl' tt). In
cases (16), (20) and (21) the unique Nash equilibrium
is fast-slow, (ti , t2"). In cases (17) and (18) the game
of timing has precisely two Nash equilibria, fast-slow,
(tl' tt), and slow-fast, (ti, t2").
Proposition 3.6. Let the game of timing have two
Nash equilibria, i.e., (17) or (18) hold. Then
(i) PI (tl' tt) ~ PI (tt, t2"), moreover, the inequality
is strict if and only if £2 < tt;
(ii) P2(tl' tt) ~ P2(tt, t2"), moreover, the inequality
is strict if and only if £1 < tt.
We conclude the general part of our study with
the description of an algorithm that finds the Nash
equilibria in the game of timing.
Step 1. Use definitions for finding the players' fast and
slow choices, ti, tt (i = 1,2).
Step 2. Use definitions (12) and (13) for finding the
players' switch times, ii (i = 1, 2).
Step 3. Use Proposition 3.5 for identifying the Nash
equilibria.
2. The rate of cost reduction, ai(ti), is given by
e-:"t(A + Ye-Pt)(t) <>-1-<> (28)ai = P Xi (1 _ e-pt )<> '
where
y =aO". (29)
4. GAS PIPELINE GAME
We apply the suggested solution method to a model
described in (Klaassen et aI., 200lb).
The cost Ci(ti) for finalizing the construction of
pipeline i (i = 1,2) at time ti is defined to be the
minimum of the integral investments
Ii(Ti) = It' e->.tTi(t)dt.
Here A is a positive discount. An investment strategy
of player i is modeled as an integrable control
function,
Ti(t) > 0, (22)
that brings the accumulated investment, Xi(t), from 0
to the prescribed commercialization level Xi > 0 at
time ti.
3. The upper benefit rate, bi1 (ti), is given by
b· (t) = e-:"t(l _ (3)1//3-1 g(t) (30)




4. The lower benefit rate, bi2 (ti), is given by
5. The following inequality is valid
bi1 (t) > bdt).
Assumption 5.2. Assume that the consumer's GDP,
g(t), and costs, Ci(t), growexponentially,
g(t) = gOe(t, Ci(t) = c?ewt (i = 1,2), (33)
«( and ware nonnegative), and
0< K < A,(23)
The dynamics of Xi(t) is modeled as
Xi(t) = -O"Xi(t) + T;(t).
Here 0" is a positive obsolescence coefficient and,
(0 < , < 1) is a delay parameter.
In the supply game arising at time t, the strategies of
player i are nonnegative rates of supply, Yi, and the
payoff to player i is defined as
Pi(Y1, Y21t) = e-:"\rr(t, y) - Ci(t))Yi. (24)
Here Y is the total rate of supply, 1r(t, y) is the price
of gas and Ci(t) > 0 is the cost for extraction and
transportation of gas for player i. The price of gas is
modeled as
(
g(t)) /31r(ylt) = Y ,
where g(t) > 0 is the consumer's GDP at time t and f3




Proposition 5.2. Under assumptions 5.1 and 5.2 the
fast choice, fi, and the slow choice, tt, of player
i (i = 1,2) is the unique solution of the algebraic
equation
(1 C pt )<>
e-:"t p<>-l x<>- - b·(t) (36)i-A + ye-pt '3 .
for j = 1,2 respectively.
We assume that g(t) and Ci(t) (i = 1,2) are given by
(33) and inequality (34) is satisfied. Formulas (30) and
(31) for bi1 (t) and bdt) are specified as
bi1 (t) = b?le-,J;t, bi2 (t) = b?2e-"'t,
Proposition 5.1. For player i (i = 1,2) the following
formulas hold.
\. The cost, Ci (td, is given
Assumption 5.1. Assume that the following
conditions hold




p<>-l e->.t; if bOe-1/Jti
Gi = - + + ,2 +(1 - e- pt ) )<>-1 'l/J
p<>-1 e:"t-; if b?1 c"'t;
(1 - e- pt , )<>-1 'l/J
where
Proposition 5.3. For i = 1, 2 we have
• 1 ('l/JGi)











We consider the game of timing in application to
the Caspian and China gas markets. The values
of the model parameters are based on preliminary
expert estimates. Our first case study deals with the
competition of two major gas pipeline projects in
the Caspian region, the "Blue Stream" project of the
Russian GAZPROM Company (project 1) which is
aimed at delivering Russian gas to Turkey under the
Black Sea; and the "Trans-Caspian" project (project
2) directed from Turkmenistan underneath the Caspian
Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey. In this
case study the parameters of the model are chosen as
follows - the discount rate: A = 0.1; the obsolescence
coefficient: a = 0.3; the delay coefficient: , = 0.65;
the inverse to the price elasticity of gas demand:
j3 = 0.55; the initial level of the consumer's GDP:
gO = 214.6; the growth rate of the consumer's GDP:( = 0.1; the growth rate of the extraction costs:
w = 0.15; the initial extraction costs: cY = 67.3,
cg = 78.4; the commercialization levels of the
accumulated investments: Xl = 4.0, X2 = 2.5. It is
assumed that the projects start in 2001.
For these parameters there exist two Nash equilibria
in the game of timing, the fast-slow equilibrium
(t1,tt) = (2002.8,2005.2), and the slow-fast
equilibrium (tt, tz)= (2004.6,2002.2).
Our second case study is related to the planned
projects of gas pipelines from Russia to China.
Two potential competitors on the North China gas
market are the "Kovikta-Zabaikalsk-Kharbin" pipeline
(project I) stretched from the Irkutsk region to
North China, and the "Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-Kharbin"
pipeline (project 2). The following values of the model
parameters are chosen: A = 0.1, a = 0.3, , = 0.58,
j3 = 0.46, gO = 1157, ( = 0.0668, w = 0.05,
cY = 57, cg = 68, Xl = 6, X2 = 3. The initial year for
the projects is set in 2001.
In this case study there exists the unique, slow-fast,
Nash equilibrium (tt, tz)= (2003.6,2002).
6. CONCLUSIONS
The paper is devoted to the analysis of a two-
player game, in which the players' strategies are
times of terminating innovation processes. In the
game between the projects the total profits act as
payoffs and commercialization times as strategies.
The analysis of the game leads to the restriction
of player's rational choices to no more than two
prescribed combinations of commercialization times,
which constitute the Nash equilibria in the game.
Typically, two Nash equilibria arise and the projects
compete for a fast commercialization scenario; its
complement, a slow commercialization scenario, is
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less profitable, representing the best response to the
fast scenario of the competitor. An algorithm for
finding the Nash equilibria is described.
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